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Capturing Saddam Hussein: how the full story got away, and what conflict journalism 
can learn from it. 
 
James Rodgers 
 
Abstract: The capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 was reported with a sense of 
triumph which must have greatly satisfied the United States forces occupying Iraq. This was 
the victory they had been looking for; the seminal moment which signalled that the invasion 
had been a success. But the reporting of that event was also a missed opportunity: an example 
of incomplete story telling.     
 
In this article, I use my personal experience of reporting on the event for the BBC as a 
starting point to examine what it, and the way it was covered, tell us about the omissions 
which are frequently a feature of conflict reporting.  The article argues that the way in which 
reporters had to work in Iraq then meant that they did not convey all of the event’s wider 
implications, and suggests how that might be improved.  
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 Even in the midst of the most technologically advanced war which had ever been fought, 
there was still a craving for the kind of news which spreads through chance conversations. ‘Is 
it true?’ asked the soldiers searching the journalists. The reporters were on their way into an 
unscheduled news conference called by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on a 
Sunday afternoon in Baghdad in December 2003. The soldiers’ initial question prefaced their 
more pressing one, which soon followed: ‘Does this mean I’ll be able to go home early?’  
 
As BBC correspondent in Baghdad that day, I was one of the reporters to whom that question 
was put. In response, journalists shrugged, or mumbled replies like ‘Well, that’s what we’re 
going to find out.’ There was impatience in some of their voices. They were in a hurry. They 
sensed that they might be about to get one of the biggest stories of their careers.  
 
Since early that morning, rumours had been spreading in the Iraqi capital. Saddam Hussein 
had been captured. The Iraqi leader had been in hiding since the invasion which had driven 
him from power. Journalists who called their news desks in foreign capitals, to share the 
rumours, found that the rumours were already circulating there, too. It became impossible to 
establish where they had begun.    
 
A sense of chaotic excitement acted as cover for a carefully planned operation which was 
underway inside the CPA building. At the same time as those wild, breathless, speculative, 
telephone calls had been taking place between journalists, another, more thoughtful, 
communication had been in progress.  
 The occupying powers in Baghdad were preparing to announce that the rumours were true: 
they had captured Saddam Hussein. Shortly after 3pm that Sunday afternoon, 14th December 
2003, Paul Bremer, the leader of the CPA told the news conference, ‘Ladies and gentlemen, 
we got him!’ 
 
Some of the Iraqi journalists leapt to their feet. They cheered wildly and shook their fists in 
the air. Some of the foreign press did so, too. Others were less sure how to react. Their faces 
betrayed signs of internal calculation. They seemed to reflect on how they, as reporters taking 
pride in their impartiality, should behave. They took in the huge professional challenge which 
lay ahead: time, as always, short – and an afternoon which might be one of the defining 
moments not just of their career, but of the United States’ career as a superpower. As if to 
mark that, Washington had planned a major event. Those journalists who did not cheer - I 
was one of them - were left feeling like churlish party guests who refuse to join in the fun.  ‘It 
seemed as if journalistic rules cherished during ‘normal’ times had to be suspended for 
journalism to do its job,’ (Waisbord 2002:206) Silvio Waisbord said of journalism in the 
United States after September 11th.  That suspension was in force in Baghdad as it had been 
in Manhattan.  
 
Nothing had been left to chance. US forces had captured Saddam Hussein the previous 
evening. The timing of the announcement, though, was the result of the demands of news 
management and presentation. 3pm in Baghdad was midday in London, and early morning on 
the East Coast of the United States. All the time zones west of the Iraqi capital were primed 
for the news which would dominate their media that day, and, so the public relations (Davis, 
2002; Davies, 2008) theory seemed to be, demonstrate that the United States and its allies 
dominated their foes.  
 
The news conference unfolded like an expertly edited television programme. The opening 
words were designed not to grab the headlines, but to be them. ‘Ladies and gentlemen, we got 
him!’ was ready made to be used, as a whole or in part, for a newspaper or website front 
page. Only a few seconds in duration, it was rehearsed to fit perfectly at the top of a broadcast 
news bulletin. And, like any good news programme, this one not only gave its audience 
something striking and exciting at the top, it also had a surprise further down the running 
order to keep them tuned in.  
 
If the ‘headline’ drew cheers, the ‘coming up next’, drew gasps. A profession proverbial in its 
cynicism was astonished when the face of Saddam Hussein – bearded, long-haired, and 
bedraggled, but unmistakeably Saddam Hussein  - appeared on a screen in the hall.   
 
Confirmation of his capture had been expected, but this had not. Now, suddenly, there was 
Iraq’s most wanted fugitive having his mouth held open as part of a medical inspection. A 
hand, gloved in surgical rubber, held his jaw apart, silencing the man whose word in this 
country had for so long been law. Saddam Hussein’s appearance before the world was 
completely controlled by his captors. They sought to control the telling of the story of the 
capture, too. That control extended far beyond the fortified confines of the CPA buildings in 
Baghdad. It reached right into the area of the country where Saddam Hussein had grown up, 
built his power base, gone into hiding, and been taken by his enemies. 
 
The next day, Monday 15th December, was the first chance which most reporters had to try to 
get to the place where that had happened. The village of al-Dawr lay to the north of Baghdad, 
near the city of Tikrit, where the United States 4th Infantry Division had made a military 
camp in the former President’s palace. Some journalists had tried to get there the day before, 
when news of the capture started to break – but this was hostile territory for foreigners, 
especially those from countries whose armies had joined the invasion, and the dark December 
days made it even more dangerous.  
 
My BBC colleagues and I set off before dawn. We arrived in al-Dawr to learn that the farm 
buildings where Saddam Hussein had been hiding lay not far from the village, along a dirt 
road. Shortly after we got there, soldiers of the U.S. Army arrived to bar our way. We who 
had travelled to the area independently were kept back from our final destination for four or 
five hours.  
 
It is logical and reasonable that access to a small area be controlled, even if, at the time, we 
resented that. The enforced delay provided us - and the other reporters who reached the same 
point as the morning went on - with an opportunity to talk to some of the villagers. Like us, 
they were curious about what was going on. A chain link fence separated us. Through a 
translator, I had a brief conversation. ‘Why didn’t he (Saddam Hussein) die a martyr?’  and 
‘If we had known he was there, we would have come to fight for him,’ were typical 
sentiments.  
 
We had not been kept back to chat. A large helicopter designed for the transport of military 
personnel came into view overhead. It landed near the farm buildings where Saddam Hussein 
had been captured.  Sensing our growing impatience, the soldiers explained what was 
happening. It seemed the helicopter had brought in the journalists who were ‘embedded’ with 
the U.S. 4th Infantry division nearby. Those members of the news media who had chosen to 
work under the conditions imposed by such an arrangement were being rewarded. They were 
getting access to the most sought-after news location in the world that day ahead of their 
competitors.  
 
The system was an echo of that which was introduced during the earlier U.S. led campaign 
against Iraq, in 1991 (Thomson, 1992). As Carruthers says of the way in which places in 
‘media reporting teams’ were allocated during that conflict,  
 
‘Only British, French, and US reporters were to enjoy this privilege, on the grounds that 
their national forces comprised the largest contingents within the coalition. Other 
nationals were shut out of this arrangement altogether, as were representatives of smaller 
or more critical publications from the three favored nations.’ (2011:132)  
 
On this occasion, the second-class treatment was meted out not only to ‘smaller’ outlets. The 
correspondents from Britain’s two main television news outlets, the BBC and ITV news, 
were among those who were held back, as was the veteran Middle East reporter, Robert Fisk. 
The rules, though, were clear: those who had agreed to ‘embed’ with the U.S. Army were 
being granted privileges for having done so.   
 
Once the dust from the departing helicopter had settled, and the ‘embeds’ had got their 
pictures, we were escorted to the hideout. There, behind a fence made of branches, and next 
to two shabby shacks, lay the entrance to the underground chamber where Saddam Hussein 
had concealed himself whenever it seemed that his pursuers might be near. The shacks 
contained things of a humble life: an old vest, and a half-eaten packet of sausages; the last 
laundry and frugal lunch of a dictator once used to luxury.  
  
We were allowed to spend just a short time there. Journalists are used to working quickly. 
Time pressure is part of the job. That day, trends in television reporting added to that 
pressure. Where once it would have been sufficient for a correspondent simply to appear on 
camera once or twice in their report, that is no longer the case, especially on such a major 
news day as this. TV correspondents are expected not just to get the story, but, increasingly, 
to perform in their reports. Pieces to camera had to be shot in different ways in different 
locations, in the hope of imparting an element of exclusivity to reports which were not. Even 
in 2003, news organizations, especially those, like the BBC, who were predominantly 
terrestrial broadcasters, were increasingly multi-platform. Reporters who were fortunate 
enough to get to the hideout were subject to intense pressure not only to tell their story in a 
distinctively better way than the person standing next to them, but also to do so in different 
ways for different media. Style battled with content.  
Soon the December daylight began to disappear. There were security concerns as well as 
pressing deadlines. Some reporters headed back to Baghdad, others made their way to the 
press centre which had been set up in the Presidential palace which now housed the 4th 
Infantry Division’s base. There was another delay before they were permitted to enter, and 
begin to prepare their material for sending.   
 
 
 
 
 
Reflections on the coverage of the event 
 
The coverage of the capture of Saddam Hussein was strongly affected by issues of access and 
objectivity, and by the pressure on journalists working on the story.   
Access was limited by the restrictions which U.S. troops placed upon reporters; by the 
numbers of correspondents who were trying to get to the hideout at the same time; and by 
concerns over security.  
 
From a superficial point of view, the role of the U.S. troops posted to keep journalists back 
from the farm was to control the number of people who were trying to get to the area. In 
effect, in fulfilling this apparently security-related role, the soldiers were additionally 
carrying out one of news management.  As Tumber and Palmer conclude about embedding, 
‘the looseness of the guidelines gives military commanders who are less sympathetic to 
journalists the discretion to remove unwanted reporters’ (2004:28). We, who were not 
formally embedded, were at the mercy of a similar kind of discretion. As Tumber and Palmer 
also write ‘the ability of the unilaterals (those journalists not officially embedded to report on 
the war) was often hampered by obstruction from the military, and concerns over safety.’ 
(2004: 33).  
So it was there. Any reporter who tried to reach the site without the troops’ permission would 
presumably have been physically restrained and then probably detained. Wandering off alone 
would have been to invite danger. In either case, it meant taking a risk, and perhaps not 
getting the story we were working so hard for.  
Part of that story was the reaction of the villagers who, it seemed, had only recently 
themselves discovered that Saddam Hussein had been close by. Yet aside from the brief 
conversations conducted through the nearby fence, no real dialogue with them was possible. 
The soldiers did not like the villagers’ being there. This was extremely hostile territory for the 
occupying forces. They soon told the villagers to retire to a distance which made further 
conversation impossible. We could perhaps have taken the road back and gone into the 
village itself. However, to do so would have meant losing our prized places in what was in 
effect the queue to see the hideout. Nor would it necessarily have been safe.  
 
The numbers trying to get to the hideout, the ‘spider-hole’, as U.S. troops and officials called 
it, also limited access. Reporters wanted so badly to get there that those who had not been in 
the area in the immediate aftermath of the capture still travelled there in the days that 
followed. The effect of so many people wanting to get to such a small place was to frustrate, 
or at least limit, journalists’ attempts to understand what had happened there.  
 
That day – seeking the impression of exclusivity referred to above - editors put a great deal of 
pressure on reporters at the scene to place themselves at the heart of the action, such as it was 
thirty six hours after the actual capture. Audience members, watching some of the resultant 
coverage, could almost have been led to conclude that the most important information they 
were being given was not that Saddam Hussein had been captured there. It was instead that a 
reporter from the news organization whose output they were watching was at the scene. In 
other words, the reporter’s presence was in effect given greater prominence than the story 
they were nominally telling. While this sort of excessive personalization is perhaps 
understandable on the day itself, it is part of a wider trend in reporting conflict and 
international affairs in general which, at its worst, can stand as an obstacle to audiences’ 
comprehension (Sreberny and Paterson 2004:6).   
 
 
Security concerns were a further factor. Even if the reporters held back by the troops had 
wanted to use the delay to explore the surrounding area a little more, they would probably 
have been ill-advised to do so. This region of Iraq, near to Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s power 
base, was deeply hostile to the occupying forces. By extension, local people might have seen 
reporters from Britain or the United States as agents of an enemy. This was before the 
kidnappings of foreign journalists but, ever since the attack on the United Nations building in 
Baghdad the previous August, foreigners in Iraq had known they were in a potentially 
dangerous environment. These concerns were understandable – but their effect was to limit 
the range of voices and views which were reflected in the coverage of the news of Saddam 
Hussein’s capture.  
 
The result was a narrative which generally lacked objectivity. ‘Objectivity’ is itself such a 
contested concept that it is difficult to refer to it without offering some kind of definition. 
Tumber and Prentoulis have provided useful analysis in this respect 
 
‘As the major signifier associated with the occupation of journalism, ‘objectivity’ is 
associated and often confused with ideas of ‘truth’, ‘impartiality’, ‘balance’ and ‘neutrality’. 
For example, a journalist’s aim may be to reach the truth (and in order to approach the truth 
they may need to be impartial) but that does not necessarily imply that the means used or the 
means that could be used, are objective.’ (2003: 215-6)   
 
A journalist’s own impressions are always going to influence their writing. (Impressions are 
not the same as personal feelings which, as Martin Bell said, have ‘no business’ (Bell 
1995:142), in war zone reporting.) Some of the most effective accounts of events such as 
these are effective precisely because they include details which enable an audience to 
visualize a place or a moment.  Nevertheless, and perhaps inevitably, the overall tone of the 
coverage tended to promote the view – prevalent since the celebratory atmosphere of the 
news conference the day before – that the capture of Saddam Hussein was a total triumph for 
the occupying forces. The restricted access described above reinforced this – although there is 
one point here about editorial values which must be emphasized. It is not reasonable to 
question the idea that getting to the hideout was the priority for news organizations on that 
day. One of the biggest single news stories since the invasion had happened, and – on that 
day at least - it had to be given the prominence that it deserved.  
In the days that followed, more could have been done to try to put the event into context. The 
atmosphere of celebration and triumph which was created around the capture should have 
been more rigorously questioned. While the celebration may have been sincere, the triumph 
was deceptive.  
As Peter Maass has written of the way in which the pulling down of a statue of Saddam 
Hussein in Baghdad the previous spring was covered ‘I had little awareness of the media 
dynamics that turned the episode into a festive symbol of what appeared to be the war’s 
finale. In reality, the war was just getting underway.’ (Maas 2011: 4) 
 
Maass’ article includes later recollections of reporters who were in the square when the statue 
was taken down. Some of them clearly felt that the accounts which were reaching audiences 
were incomplete. As he notes of those present, ‘much of the crowd was made up of 
journalists and marines’ (Mass 2011: 14).  
 
The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue, and the later capture of the former Iraqi leader 
himself, were both portrayed as moments of great victory for the United States and its allies.  
Both, with hindsight, were invested with greater importance than they merited.   
  
 
 
 
Return to Gaza 
 
From the professional point of view of a journalist covering the war in Iraq, I was very 
pleased to have been involved in reporting the capture of Saddam Hussein.   
 
Even at the time, though, I was concerned that the overall impression which we reporters in 
Iraq were giving was one of unqualified success for the occupying forces. As such, it was 
potentially misleading. I tried to redress this in a piece which I wrote for the BBC’s website a 
few days later.  
 
  The mood in the "Sunni triangle" north and west of Baghdad is completely different. In the 
heartland of Saddam Hussein's former power base, there are two emotions: sadness and 
astonishment.  
In al-Dawr, where Saddam was finally dragged from his underground hideout, people are 
shocked at what has happened.  
"Saddam had a gun. Why didn't he resist?" one villager asked me.  
No-one can believe that the man who portrayed himself as the heir to a noble Arab warrior 
tradition did not put up a fight.  (Rodgers 2003) 
Even coverage like that did not really question the United States’ interpretation and 
presentation of the capture. It did at least show that there were people not prepared to rejoice, 
but there was no suggestion that they were preparing to fight. Yet, given that the insurgency 
in earnest began the following spring, there must have been people at that stage who were 
planning it. That part of the account of the invasion and occupation of Iraq was missing, with 
the result that, while the United States may have captured their quarry, journalists did not 
capture the full story, and audiences, in whose name the invasion had been launched, were 
not being told what they needed to know, what Jean Seaton has called ‘our realistic 
apprehension of what is happening’ (Seaton 2003:48).    
I had gone to Iraq only on a short assignment. At the time, I was the BBC’s correspondent in 
the Gaza Strip, a post I held from 2002-2004. I shared an office with Fayed Abushammala, 
who was correspondent in the territory for the BBC’s Arabic Service.  
We worked together covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians watched closely the situation in Iraq, trying to understand how it would affect 
their fight with each other.  As it became clearer that the United States would attack Iraq, so 
the opposition to the coming invasion grew in Gaza. Many Palestinians saw Saddam Hussein 
as a friend and ally. Photographs of him appeared in shop windows and car windscreens. 
Most often, he was shown wearing battledress and a black beret, smiling and waving. Less 
frequently, he was pictured in traditional dress, a latter-day Arab knight preparing to repel 
invading crusaders. His heroic status in Gaza was derived from his implacable enmity 
towards Israel. Residents then remembered fondly the sight of Iraqi scud missiles crossing the 
winter desert sky in January 1991, during the previous U.S.-led campaign against Iraq, on 
their way to strike Tel Aviv. Saddam Hussein sent money to the families of those who had 
been killed in the conflict with Israel. For a people who felt they had few friends, Saddam 
Hussein did sometimes seem like the king-warrior of his photographs.   
Living and working in this environment had made me deeply sceptical of the suggestion, 
advanced by neoconservatives in the United States, that their invading forces would be 
welcomed as liberators. My scepticism was not based on an idea that the people of Iraq 
overwhelmingly supported Saddam Hussein, as his rigged referenda had suggested. It was 
based on the loathing for living under occupation which I saw around me. I could not imagine 
that Iraqis would readily accept what the Palestinians found so crushing, stifling, and 
humiliating. Of course, if the invaders really were able to deliver the freedom and prosperity 
they predicted would follow the removal of Saddam Hussein, then perhaps the population 
would not rebel in large numbers. If durable peace did follow war, the occupation could be 
short. It seemed, though, that neoconservative wishful thinking alone made such a prospect 
likely.  
On my return from Iraq, Fayed and I spoke of the conflict, and the way the BBC was 
covering it. He wondered why the BBC had not tried to work in Iraq the way that we did in 
Gaza.  Fayed had built up an extensive network of contacts throughout the Gaza Strip. 
Despite the size of the territory – some 45km from north to south by just 10km from the sea 
to the fence which marked the beginning of Israel – travelling around it was extremely 
difficult. The journey from Gaza City to Rafah, a town and refugee camp in the south of the 
territory near the border with Egypt, should have taken around thirty minutes. It could take 
ten times as long, or be impossible altogether, depending on the activities of the Israeli army. 
This limited ability to travel meant that reliable contacts in nearby places were invaluable. 
They were invaluable not just for political information, for rumour, and for opinion, but for 
facts. Eyewitnesses could provide us with what we were otherwise kept from. Fayed’s 
network consisted of security officials; members of Palestinian political movements; medical 
personnel; neighbours; relatives; and friends. There were some sources it was difficult for 
him to call upon: the Israeli Army in particular. They operate a round-the-clock press office 
with English-speaking personnel, but Palestinian journalists are not encouraged to call. I was 
able to add Israeli military comment to the information which Fayed’s sources provided. On 
the occasions when there was a British story (twice during my time there the Israeli Army 
shot British citizens – one fatally, the other dying later) I was able to contribute information 
from British diplomatic sources.1  
The network which the bureau established worked extremely efficiently. During my two 
years there, both Fayed and I were challenged over our reporting. His fellow Gazans 
sometimes accused him of being insufficiently pro-Palestinian. I received emails accusing me 
of being too pro-Palestinian. I do not recall a time when we were challenged over the facts we 
presented, only over the way we presented them.  
Since I stopped being a full-time journalist, and began instead to teach and research 
journalism and media, I have focused on conflict reporting. I began by re-reading those 
memoirs and other accounts of working journalists which I had found most illuminating 
during my time as a reporter.  
One idea above all others seemed to encapsulate the challenges faced by journalists in 
wartime, ‘Conventional journalism could no more reveal this war than conventional 
firepower could win it’. (Herr 1975: 175) 
Michael Herr was writing about Vietnam, but his words conveyed perfectly the complexity of 
the task which faced a later generation of reporters: the generation which wrote about the 
conflicts which broke out following the end of the cold war, and the attacks of September 
11th. These were only ‘conventional’ wars in the sense that they did not involve nuclear 
weapons. By any other measure, they did not fit with an adjective which suggested states 
going to war against each other with regular standing armies.  
 
My recent research, therefore, has been dedicated to finding a way of developing a kind of 
reporting which can better ‘reveal’ the conflicts of our age. My work has focused on the 
potential offered by the latest technology, but also on examples from history.  
 
William Howard Russell, who reported from the Crimean War for ‘The Times’, is usually 
considered the first of the professional war correspondents. A man who shared his surname, 
James Russell, was my ancestor, and a soldier at the battle of Waterloo.   
My family has a letter which he wrote back to his wife and sons to tell them that he had 
survived what he called ‘a most Bloody Battle with the French as ever was fought’. Although 
he is only one cavalryman out of thousands of combatants who took to the battlefield that 
day, he is aware of the strategic importance of the fight in which he is involved. ‘We are in 
hopes that another firm battle will settle this business,’ he writes, ‘for we are now two days 
march into France without interruption and report says his army is almost annihilated.’ 
Having started his letter with reassurances to his family, he goes on to tell them what he 
knows of the wider situation, before returning, towards the end, to his own condition. ‘I 
would change the subject and inform you of myself.  I have lost all my things.  This day I am 
getting a dead Frenchman’s shirt washed to put on.  My horse was wounded and sent into 
Brussels during the action and has lost my whole kit so I am now as I stand.’ In the space of 
six hundred or so words, we get an impression of the personal experience of a soldier who 
fought in one of the most important battles of his age, and of that battle’s wider significance.    
 Some forty years later, William Howard Russell was watching the suffering of British 
soldiers dying of their injuries in the Crimea. ‘It was agonizing to see the wounded men who 
were lying there under a broiling sun, parched with excruciating thirst, racked with fever, and 
agonized with pain – to behold them waving their caps faintly, or making signals towards our 
lines, over which they could see the white flag waving.’ (Russell 2008: 220) His is a different 
perspective. He is looking from a distance. James Russell, who writes of ‘dead and wounded’ 
from his own regiment, The Scots Greys, ‘scarcely to be numbered’, presumably saw the 
same kind of suffering right next to him but chooses not to distress his wife and young sons 
with the details. For his is a personal account, not meant for publication, where William 
Howard Russell’s account was something else altogether: a professional account, most 
definitely intended for publication.  The two types combined can surely provide audiences 
with a fuller picture than often they receive from conflict zones. Contemporary technology 
provides the opportunity for accounts such as my great-great-great-great grandfather’s not 
only to reach families more quickly, but also to be made public.  
 
This has already started happening. In the autumn of 2009, the BBC’s ‘Today’ programme 
began broadcasting – in addition to news and features from BBC journalists in Afghanistan – 
contributions from a serving British Army officer, Major Richard Streatfeild.   
 
‘I always had a view that maybe as soldiers we weren’t as good at explaining to people, to a 
broader audience, what it was that we were going through on a day to day basis. There were 
very few genuine voices from the front line coming through,’ (Streatfeild 6 January 2011 
interview) he says. The process which led to Streatfeild’s contributions was complicated. The 
BBC and the Ministry of Defence, were ‘nervous’ (Streatfeild 6 January 2011 interview) 
about each other’s motives. There were practical difficulties, too. While internet access and 
simple equipment (Streatfeild says he used a basic voice recorder, and then sent his reports as 
email attachments) made his contributions possible in the first place, he could not have been 
relied upon as a regular correspondent. ‘There was a period from January, through to about 
the end of February, middle of February, where we were involved in such a lot of stuff 
operationally that I didn’t write a thing,’ (Streatfeild 6 January 2011 interview) he recalls.  
It is reminiscent of the problems which Philip Knightly describes in ‘The First Casualty’.  
Before the Crimea, British editors either stole war news from foreign newspapers, or 
employed junior officers to send letters from the battlefront, a most unsatisfactory 
arrangement. For not only were these soldier-correspondents highly selective in what they 
wrote, regarding themselves first as soldiers and then as correspondents; they also understood 
little of the workings of newspapers, or even of what constituted ‘news’. (Knightley 1989: 4) 
Such an arrangement, its difficulties notwithstanding, would not work today. Streatfeild does 
not see himself as an ‘officer-journalist’ or ‘soldier-correspondent’. No serious news 
organization, apart perhaps from one designed for serving soldiers, would use an officer as a 
reporter. They can, though, be used as contributors to a greater extent than they have been 
before.  
If we are going to hear from army officers, we should also hear from their enemies. We 
should hear from them for two reasons above all: in the interests of true impartiality, and 
because we need to hear from them if we are to get as full a picture as possible of what is 
going on. In the same way that few insurgencies or guerrilla conflicts are ever solved without 
representatives of states and regular armies talking to those they consider terrorists, no 
insurgency can be properly reported unless journalists talk to the insurgents. In any news 
culture that prizes impartiality, a reporter would never dream of doing a political story 
without talking to more than one party. The same should be true of reporting conflict.  
Conclusion: ‘The Gaza Model’ 
The reporting of the capture of Saddam Hussein failed to tell the full story in that it failed to 
reflect the anger at the occupation of Iraq – anger which at that time was growing, and would, 
only four months later, explode into uprising. These shortfalls could have been reduced, if not 
avoided, by the establishment in Iraq of the kind of journalistic network of sources which the 
BBC used in Gaza during my time as correspondent there.  
In ‘Supermedia’, Charlie Beckett argues, ‘What we are striving for here is what I call 
‘Editorial Diversity’. Essentially, this is an openness to engage with new sources, 
perspectives, and narratives, and an ability to use them to create networked journalism.’ 
(Beckett 2008: 150). 
To this end, I have identified four main areas where journalism in wartime can evolve in 
order to improve. I call this the “Gaza model’ for conflict reporting, because one of its main 
inspirations is the network of sources which the BBC built up in that territory.    
 
                                                                                                                                           
Conflict reporting needs to be collaborative in order to make the most of information which 
different journalists are able to gather, as when Fayed Abushammala and I pooled our 
resources in Gaza.  
It needs to be drawn from as many sources as possible. Had I spoken to the villagers of al-
Dawr for longer that day, I might have been persuaded to seek to learn more about the likely 
extent of opposition to the occupation. Instead, like Maas, only later did I realize that, ‘In 
reality, the war was just getting underway.’  
While I am proposing using a wider range of sources, I do not expect them all to be reflected 
in every individual report. Instead, I believe there is a case for abandoning rigorous ideas of 
balance – i.e. if a report contains a clip with an Israeli, it must also contain one with a 
Palestinian – in favour of the idea of impartiality over time. In the case of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, for example, an entire report could focus on Israeli views provided 
another entire report focused on Palestinian views. The idea of ‘balance over time’ is already 
used by the BBC and other broadcasters to satisfy the legislation governing the covering of 
elections. It would work well here, too.  
More extensive use of mobile technology is my fourth point. In the twenty years I worked as 
a journalist, it changed massively the way in which news was gathered and distributed. Many 
authors (Beckett, 2008; Shirky, 2009; Seib, 2008) have written on these effects, so there is no 
The Gaza model for conflict reporting is 
collaborative  
drawn from as many sources as possible – both sides in a conflict indispensable 
impartial by providing balance over time  
and uses mobile technology and social networks for news gathering and distribution  
need to go into further detail here. Since the conflicts I have looked at here – the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict between 2002 and 2004, and the invasion of Iraq, mobile technology has 
become more widely available. Now, members of a reporters’ network are more likely to be 
able to send video, stills, or audio rather than just give information over the phone. All the 
same, this is only part of the solution. As Robinson et al have written, ‘Even if, over time, 
new communication technologies have increased the potential power of news media outlets, 
increasingly professional government media-management techniques may have been 
effective in countering these developments.’ (Robinson et al 2010: 29). As always, journalists 
will need to strive to have better, and more credible, sources than those with power – political 
or commercial - who might seek to undermine them.   
I do not underestimate the huge editorial, political, and practical challenges which such an 
approach will involve. Politicians will rage against the idea of ‘terrorists’ being given a 
platform. Editors - as can be their habit – will on occasion seek to dictate the story to their 
correspondents.   
And the ‘new sources’ of which Beckett writes will need to be given time and space. The 
reporter who makes him or herself the story should take a step to the side. My time in the 
‘spider hole’ that December day could have been better spent talking to more sources rather 
than filming endless versions of a piece to camera. As Daniel Hallin predicted more than a 
decade ago, with reference to earlier sources, ‘For one thing, as Carey (1993) has argued, 
journalists will probably have to shift from conceiving of themselves as, in effect, a 
representative or stand in for a unitary but inactive public, to a role of facilitating and 
publicizing public dialogue.’ (Hallin 2000: 234-5).  
It is time for these trends to be combined into a new and more complete way of covering 
conflict. Let us listen to the angry voices behind the fence for what they may tell us of what is 
to come.  
1
 Tom Hurndall, an activist with the pro-Palestinian ‘International Solidarity Movement’, was 
shot on 11 April 2003. He died from his wounds on 6 January 2004. James Miller, a 
cameraman, was shot and killed on 2 May 2003.  
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